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"DECISION TREES"
by Peter L. Strauss and Michael R. Toppingt
The object of this paper is to inform those concerned with the administration
of justice in Ethiopia - particularly, criminal justice - about a new and simple
procedure which may assist in procuring uniform interpretation and application of
laws and regulations. The problem of uniform interpretation and applicatioh is
particularly severe where, as in Ethiopia, new laws must be interpreted and applied
by persons who have not yet had the opportunity of formal legal education. For
these persons the discovery of the relevant code articles and the understanding of
their interrelationships and application must be very difficult indeed. One possible
result of this unfortunate state of affairs is that the codes will not be fully, effec-
tively, or consistently applied throughout the Empire. If, on the other hand, admini-
strators try to avoid this problem by assigning the Empire's comparatively few
legally trained persons to such jobs as public prosecutor, woreda court judge, etc,
then the result may be waste of legal resources. No one of these jobs is, in natio-
nal perspective, of the very greatest importance; overall inefficiency of performance
in them, on the other hand, can markedly reduce the quality of Ethiopian justice.
The most efficient use of Ethiopia's limited legal resources might be promoted
by a scheme which enabled the central administration in Addis Ababa to send
provincial centers of law enforcement programmed instruction, which would enable
even persons who have not had formal legal training to proceed, step by step,
through the solution of a legal problem to its proper conclusion. This paper is
concerned with one such form of programmed instruction, which involves the cons-
truction of what have been designated variously as "algorithms," "flow charts,"
"logical trees," or "decision trees."* The last term, "decision tree," will be used
here, since it best expresses the purpose of the procedure: to assist local adminis-
trators to reach uniform and correct decisions in applying national law. For reasons
of convenience, this article will discuss "decision trees" only as they might apply
in penal law. It will be apparent, however, that the procedure could as easily find
application in any area of codified law.
If we take almost any article of the Penal Code, we shall observe that for
it to be applicable, a number of conditions have to be satisfied. Let us take as
an example, Article 589(I), which defines the principal offence of rape. Before that
offence is constituted, there must be:
(a) an accused who has
(b) compelled
(c) a woman
* Formerly members of the Faculty of Law, Haile Sellassie I University.
** A clear and comprehensive account of the nature and uses of decision trees is to be foundin B.N. Lewis, I.S. Horogin & C.P. Gane, flow Charts, Logical Trees and Algorithms, Lon-don HMSO, 1967, to which the present writers are indebted.
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(d) to submit to sexual intercourse
(e) outside wedlock by
either (f) violence
or (g) grave intimidation
or (h) after having rendered her unconscious
or (i) incapable of resistance.
Unless each of conditions (a), (b) (c) (d) and (e), and, at least, one of condi-
tions (f), (g), (h) or (i) are satisfied in any given case, the offence of rape has
not been committed.
A check list such as this, indicating the necessary pre-conditions for application,
could be prepared for almost any code provision. In this form, however, it might
not seem to serve any useful purpose. It appears to be little more than a cumber-
some way of restating the article itself.
One of the contributions of the decision tree becomes apparent if the check
list is put in question form:
1. (a) Did the suspect use violence on a person?
(b) Did the suspect use grave intimidation on a person?
(c) Did the suspect render a person unconscious?
(d) Did the suspect render a person incapable of resistance?
2. Was that person a woman?
3. Did he thus compel that woman to submit to sexual intercourse?
4. Was that act of sexual intercourse between persons who were not then husband
and wife?
and if a mandatory instruction is added:
The suspect may be convicted of rape only if the answer to each of questions
2, 3 and 4 and to at least one of questions l(a), 1(b), l(c) or l(d) is "yes."
The form serves to emphasize the separate elements which must be present to
constitute the offence, by requiring the local administrator to answer relevant ques-
tions and instructing him to proceed only if certain answers to those questions
are obtained. He is thus forced to analyze the evidence in the appropriate way,
and taken, step by step, through a decision process which he might not have cor-
rectly understood by himself.
The decision tree itself embodies the same technique of breaking legal pro-
visions down into their constituent elements, and then presenting each element in
the form of a simple question. It goes further, and puts these questions in logical
order and diagrammatic form. This has the advantage, as we shall see later in
dealing with more complex "decision trees," of simplifying the mandatory instruc-
tion. For the user, it has the great advantage of being a visual as well as a
verbal process, and of never requiring him to do more than answer "yes" or "no"
to a simple question. The only constraint is that having answered one question,
he must proceed to the question diagrammatically indicated by that answer, and
so on to a stated result, which he must accept as correct. The proedeure automa-
tically directs him to the appropriate questions and the correct outcome. In the
words of Messrs. Lewis, Horogin and Gane the user "is like a computer working
through a program. In both cases the process is automatic, and provided there
are no ambiguities of instruction, a successful outcome is guaranteed."
The simplest way of explaining the nature and use of decision trees is by
examples. Let us therefore, first of all try to put the requirements for the commi-
ssion of the offence of rape, as defined by Article Penal Code 589, in "decision tree "form.
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Fig. I
START
Did the suspect use violence upon a woman?
L
Did he compel the woman
to submit to sexual inter-
course under such influen-
ce?
Yes
Was that act of
intercourse outside
of wedlock?
Did suspect use grave intimidation upon a woman?
Yes
No
Yes Did suspect render a woman
unconscious?
No
Yes
589 inapplicable
I
Did suspect render a woman
incapable of resistance?
589 inapplicable I
589 applicable 589 inapplicable
This diagram is, it is hoped, self-explanatory. Like the words of Article 589 them-
selves, it serves to define the offence of rape by setting forth the pre-requisites of
the offence. By stating these pre-requisites separately, and in question form, it per-
forms the significant added function of predigesting the article -stressing what is
important and forcing the administrator's attention, in logical order, to the conclu-
sions he must reach in order to justify conviction. The administrator is no longer
completely free to overlook or to misunderstand one of the constituent elements
of the offence.
The diagram assumes, however, that the administrator has already decided,
by some other means, that "rape" is in fact the crime he is interested in. An
additional, and greater, use of decision trees is to assist in the making of this
kind of decision: to help the administrator decide which of several provisions before
him is relevant to a case at hand. Decision trees which perform this finding func-
tion have been called "homing decision trees." A very simple example of such a
tree, one step more complex than our tree for Article 589(1), can be constructed with
reference to the crime of bigamy. This is a crime which can be committed in
either one of two fact situations. Under Article 616(1), bigamy is committed by the
already married person who intentionally contracts another marriage before dissolu-
- 449 -
Digitized from Best Copy Available
I
JOURNAL OF ETHIOPIAN LAW - VOL VII- No. 2
tion of the first; under Article 616(2), bigamy is committed by an unmarried person
who marries another whom he knows to be tied by the bond of an existing mar-
riage.
The following decision tree would enable us to determine whether in any given
case Article 616 is applicable, and, if it is, whether a charge should be preferred
under Article 616(1) or Art. 616(2).
Fig. 2
START
Was the suspect validly married immediately
before the occurrence of any events which
might have given rise to a criminal charge?
Yes
Did he intentionally con-tract another marriage?
INo
Did he thereafter marry?
Was such other marri- 616 inapplicable Was his partner tied 616 inapplicable
age contracted before by the bond of an
the dissolution of existing marriage?
the first?
Yes No
Did he know of this fact 616 inapplicable
at the time of the marriage?
Yes No
I I
Charge under 616(2) j 616 inapplicable
This, again, is a very simple model, but it does help us to see how a pro-
perly constructed decision tree can be utilized to select the appropriate code pro-
vision.
In the two simple decision trees produced above, no effort has been made to
show the relationships which every Special Part article has to articles of the Gene-
ral Part. In consequence, the mere use of these decision trees would not (any
more than simple reference to Article 589 or Article 616) enable the user to decide
upon the disposition of the case. For example, the accused might plead a mistake
of fact, (Article 76) - in a rape case, that he thought the woman was his wife; in a
bigamy case, that he believed a previous marriage was no longer valid. Questions
of attempt, guilt, causality, responsibility, and the like may often arise in ways
which would not always be obvious to the untrained person faced with the neces-
- 450 -
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616 inapplicable
Charge under 616(1)
Fig. 3
Was there an effort to have sexual intercourse
with a woman without her consent?
Was a man's sexual organ introd-
uced into the woman's?
I[ArL 589 inapplicable.[
I
Yes
Was the man having such interco-
urse with the woman her husband?
Yes
Was it believed he was her
husband?
Yes No
Art. 589 1 See decision tree
inapplicable on attempt.
Did the woman seem to agree
to the act of intercourse ?
YesI
Was grave intimidation first used
on her?
See decision tree on attempt for
possible incomplete offence.
- I Was there intent* to compel her
to have intercourse with a person
not her husband?
*(See decision tree on criminal
guilt)
No
Yes I
I
Art. 589 inapplicable
Was the act the product of the 1
No Jabove intent?
Y NYes No14
I II - o j 589 applicable f 589 inapplicable
NO
/ -yes- Was violence used on her ?
Was her submission
of this influence?
Yes
j589 applicable
the product
No
Punishable only
as attempt, Arts.
27/589.
Yes
Yei
I
Was she rendered unconscious? I
I
NoI
Was she rendered incapable of I1resistance?
No
Was the agreement otherwise
compelled?
No
Ii Art. 589 inapplicable
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sity to understand or administer the codes. It would be inefficient to deal withthese general questions, which could arise under almost any provision of the Spe-cial Part, in each decision tree that was constructed with respect to a particularoffence; these questions may deserve separate, generalized trees of their own. Butit may promote efficiency in applying the Code to indicate in decision trees forspecific offences how, at least, the most common of these general questions mightarise. Thus, our decision tree on rape might be revised to accomplish this in themanner shown by Fig. 3 above.
We are now in a position to take more complex examples, which go farther:towards showing the interrelationships of a group of legal provisions. Too mtchcomplexity in a single tree, however, might threaten to deprive the tree of its vglueas a simplifier of the law. Moreover, enough has been said about decision treesto realize that they may have. several uses. The prosecutor will want to knowhow to coordinate provisions of the Special part to which he might refer in formula-ing his charge. He may also find it valuable to have reference to General Partprovisions which could modify the charge or affect proof requirements at trial.He may not, on the other hand, be overly interested in possible defences, or inlearning of the circumstances which could authorize a judge to increase or decrease asentence. Thus, for his purposes, only some of the many interrelationships need beshown. Similarly, for the judge, less emphasis on possibilities for charge and moreemphasis on possibilities for disposition may be appropriate. A separate, educationalfunction may be served by decision trees which reveal the interrelationships ofcommonly used sections of the General Part.
The three decision trees which follow are intended as examples of each ofthese types. The first emphasizes the "homing tree" approach which may help pro-secutors to find the appropriate charge among several interrelated provisions. It isprincipally based on the nine articles of Book V, Title I, Chapter 1, Section IIof the Special Part, dealing with abortion. The second is derived from this tree,but stresses sentencing information. The third, dealing with General Part problems,might help answer the question whether an incomplete offence has been perpetrated.
The reader will by now have been led to an obvious question: how does onedraft a decision-tree? There is - at any rate for the lawyer - no answer. To quoteMessrs. Lewis, Horogin, and Gane once more, constructing a decision tree "is avaluable exercise in clear thinking. This is so because the compiler must penetratean often dense and tortuous style in order to determine that which will exactlyembody the rules governing the decision making process." A logical basis for adecision tree is of course essential, but it is not (for the lawyer) enough: a certainintuitive element is involved. In compiling our decision tree relating to abortion, wemight have felt it necessary to cover the situation of an abortion procured duringan election meeting: we might have felt it necessary to deal with the hypothesisthat the abortion was performed in Khartoum 
.. and so forth. The situationseemed too remote from the normal and therefore a selective process was applied.The size of any particular tree must be limited. The drafting of decision treesis an art as well as a science. There is no reason, in theory, why we could notconstruct a tree which covered the whole area of penal law, including procedure,a tree which would tell us whether any, and if so, which offence or offences hadbeen committed, what charge or charges should be preferred, how the subsequenttrial proceedings should be conducted, what modes of disposition were open to thecourt in the event of a conviction, and by what considerations the court should beguided in its ultimate disposition. There are, however, no office walls large enough to
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Fig. 4 ABORTION
Was there an effort to terminate the pregnancy
of a woman believed to be pregnant? I
Yes No
Was the effort deliberate? J. No Abortion laws do not apply (except those
Yes relating to advertising, see Art. 802(b)
Did the effort succeed? No 
__ Was the woman pregnant?
Yes 
_ 
_
t Yes _ 1 No
Was the effort made Aswer remaining questions. I Answer remaining quettions.by the woman? If a charge is justified cite If a charge is justified, cite
I Art. 27 in addition. Arts. 27, 29, and 532 inYes No j addition.
Was she assisted? (See "principals"). 1 Was it made with her apparent consent?
Yes No Yes NO
Charge all par- Chreher I Was this consent ex- Was it made, whjleticipants under Charge torted by threats, co- she was incapable ofArt 529 529. ercion or deceit? consenting, with the
-
consent of her legalrepresentative ornext
I-Yes I Yes of kin?
Charge all under 530(2). e YeNo
Was there a grave and imminent danger Was there a grave and imminent dangerto her life and health which could only to her life or health which could only bebe averted in this way? averted by immediate intervention?
Yes Yes
Was the intervention done by Z Was the intervention done bya registered medical practitioner? o a registered medical practitioner?
Yes No Yes No
IWere the formalities of! jarge all actorsi Charge him under CarellctsArt. 534 observed? untmderArt. 530(1)1,2 Art. 536(2), 7903, underArt. 530(2),
Yes No
Were the formalities of Art. I j Was there a grave and imminent danger to her535 observed? I life and health which could only be averted by
- immediate intervention?
NOYe 
No
Charge under 1 Was notification subsequently Charge all actors un-Art. 535(2) 3 given to the proper authorities? der Art. 530(1) 1, 2.
SJNo
j N o charge j - -- I Charge doctor under Arts. 536(2). 790.3
I. See next page for possibilities of aggravation and mitigation of penalty.
2. It is uncertain whether the woman is guilty of an offence.
3. In ease of repeated offences, Art. 122 may also be cited.
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ed in its ultimate disposition. There are, however, no office walls large enough to
carry the necessary tree. Nor, if there were, would anyone wish to use such a
complex instrument which would hardly simplify size limits the decision tree's effec-
tiveness for the law. It is for this reason that there is an intuitive as well as a
logical element involved in the construction of legal decision trees.
Fig. 5
II. Sentencing persons found to have violated abortion provisions
A. MITIGATION
Was the abortion performed (or attempted) on
account of an exceptionally grave state of I
physical distress? For example, after rape or
incest, or as a result of extreme poverty).
Yes Not I - I _
Free mitigation under Art. 185 I Was there nonetheless great material
is possible. (Art. 533). 1 or moral distress, apprehension of a
grave threat, or justified fear? ,
Yes No
8 iited smiigatn ur . YWas the offender acting under the
Limite mitiation urt 9influence of a person to whom he owed
obedience or on whom he depended?
No
Did the offender act out of an honorable1-Yes-I and disinterested motive, or because of a
high religious, moral or civil conviction?
No
-
Yes - Was the offender previously of good
character?
Yes No
Did he act without thought or because of lack of
intelligence, ignorance, or simplicity of mind?
-
No
Mitigation will not ordinarily be possible.
It should now be clear what the decision tree can do. An important caveat
must be entered at this stage to indicate what a decision tree cannot do. It can-
not perform the truly creative part of the lawyer's task, but only the mechanical,
part. A decision tree is helpful where and only where no dispute arises as to the
- 454 -
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meaning of the questions which the user has to answer. We could, for example,
construct a decision tree for Penal Code Articles 608-613 relating to offences tending to
corrupt public morals, and at various points our tree would ask the user whether an
act was "obscene" or "purely artistic, literary or scientific in character." No deci-
sion tree, no mechanical process, can answer such a question, save in the clearest
of cases. The user of the tree can properly decide that an authoritative and lavi-
shly illustrated medical text book on anatomy is not obscene, and that some work
of "hard-core" pornography is. But he can do nothing with D.H. Lawrence's con-
troversial novel, Lady Chatterley's Lover. That is a matter for the courts, for genui-
nely creative legal argument in the light of external authority and policy analysis.The decision tree, in fact, does the boring part of the lawyer's job.
S
B. Aggravation
Has the offender made a profession of abortion,
that is, does he try to acquire a gain whenever
the opportunity presents itself?
No
Yes
Did the offender in this case act
principally in order to acquire
financial gain?
No
Is the offender a doctor, pharmacist, Yes Fiscal penalties unjustified
midwife, nurse, or similar professional?
Yes
_________________________No
Court may prohibit practice, either Court may impose a fine of uptemporarily or (for repeated offences) to E $ 10,000 in addition topermanently, Art. 53(2). It may also imprisonment to the degree provi-impose a fine of up to E $10,000 in addi- ded and confiscation of any profit,tion to imprisonment to the degree pro- Arts. 531(1) and 90.
vided and the confiscation. of any profit,
Arts. 531(2) and 90.
The general aggravating circumstances of Art.
81 may also apply, and justify imposition of a
punishment within the upper range of the limits
given.
Efficient legal administration, however, requires that this boring part of thelawyer's job be well done. Issues must be swiftly and accurately identified, so that
appropriate evidence and arguments can be marshalled for creative work. The dis-
covery of relevant code articles, their relationship and application, is an essentialfirst step. In a nation such as Ethiopia, where formal legal education is not yet
widespread, even this first step must often be difficult indeed. As stated above,
what the decision tree might do is to facilitate the taking of this important first
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Fig. 6 DEGREES IN THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENCE (Arts. 26-31)
I Is suspect to be charged with an intentional offence? I
IYes
Is the offence one under the Code of I
Petty Offences?
YesI
Petty offences may be prosecuted only if
complete, i.e., only if all elements of
a violation are present, Art. 696.
Yes
Did the suspect act or intentionally
omit to act in some way helpful to the No
commission of the offence?
SYes
No I
Negligent offences are prosecuted only
if the offence is complete, i.e., if the
forbidden result was caused by accused's
negligent behavior, Art. 27.
No
Did the suspect intend to commit the,
offence?
No
Suspect cannot be found guilty of the
Did this act unequivocably point, by way of direct consequence, to the commission of the offence?
I Yes
Was the accused, because of simplicity
of mind or superstition, using completely
harmless means or processes? (E.g., spells,
"magic" water).
Yes
Accused is not punishable, Art.
29, second paragraph.
Was accused using means (e.g., unloaded
rifle) or acting against an object (e.g.,
tree stump) such that the offence (e.g.,
homicide) could not conceivably be com-
pleted?
SYes I No
Art. 29. Impossibility, Does the offence
applies. Court may, but which accused is cbi
need not reduce punish- require achievemei
ment underArt. 185 from a particular result'
that for full offence. Yes No
Did the result T
Occ~? IThe completed I
occur? I offense should
7 yes No be charged.
Was it caused by I
the accused's act? Did accused prevent or
Vtielp to prevent the result
- by acting of his own
The complet free will?
ed offence sh- N
ould becharg- NO - "
ed. [ Attempt, Art. 27. Active re
Court may reduce ce, Art. 28
full offense pena- i urt may
lty. Art. 185. 1 full offenc
Ity Art. 1:
Acts which merely prepare or make
possible an offence are punishable only if
a Special Part of Petty Offence provision
expressly makes them punishable, e.g.
Arts. 269, 472, 763. Art. 26.
I-No When accused ceased acting, had he
pursued his criminal activity to its end,
so that there remained no more for him
to do?
Yes [No
Did he cease acting of his own free
will, without interference from external
circumstances or the authorities?
Yes No
with Was he prompted by
arged honesty or high motives?
at of I No
?Yes N
Yes_ Art. 28(I), Renu-
Renuniatio.No ] nciation, requires
Renunciation o 1 reduction of pen-
punishment poss- alty for full offe-
ible, Art. 28(1). nce under 184;
permits it under
Art. 185.
Did accused use means or act against
an object such that the offence could
not conceivably have been completed?
Yes
Art. 29, Impossi-
bility applies. Co-
urt may reduce
full offence pena-
lty, Art. 185.
No
Attempt, Art. 27.
Court may redu-
ce full offence
penalty, Art. 184.
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step. Presumably, it does not need a high-level legal education to know that oneis dealing with abortion rather than with an electoral offence. Given, then, an
appropriately drafted set of basic decision trees the efficiency of local law enforce-
ment officers not possessing a legal education would be greatly enhanced, and atthe same time those who did possess a formal legal education would be releasedfrom the mere mechanics of law to finding the more creative and more important
tasks for which their training has fitted them.
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